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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge: 
 
This appeal concerns three challenges to Keith Mathis's 
conviction for bank robbery and conspiracy to commit bank 
robbery. First, Mr. Mathis claims that the District Court 
wrongly admitted into evidence testimony describing his 
involvement in previous, uncharged bank robberies. 
Second, Mr. Mathis asserts that the District Court erred in 
admitting evidence that his picture was selected from a 
photographic array, because the array was 
unconstitutionally suggestive. Third, Mr. Mathis argues 
that the District Court wrongly excluded expert testimony 
that called into question eyewitness testimony identifying 
Mr. Mathis as he fled from the robbery. As described 
herein, we disagree with Mr. Mathis's first and second 
arguments on their merits; with respect to the third, we 
hold that the District Court erred in part, but we find it 
highly improbable that such error affected the jury's 
decision. Thus, we affirm Mr. Mathis's conviction. 
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I. Background 
 
On October 20, 1998, a grand jury indicted Mr. Mathis, 
Steven Gantt, and Jeffrey Seaberry on one count of bank 
robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. SS 2113(a) and 2, and one 
count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 371. The indictment charged the three men 
with conspiring, from October 11 to October 14, 1998, to 
rob the Sun National Bank in Maple Shade, New Jersey, 
and with successfully robbing that bank on October 14, 
1998. Mr. Mathis pled not guilty to both counts, and his 
trial commenced on January 19, 1999. 
 
At Mr. Mathis's trial, two witnesses testified that they 
saw, from an adjoining office building, three masked men 
with guns run into, and then out of, Sun National Bank. 
These witnesses testified that the three masked men drove 
away in a dark-colored Jeep. Also, several Sun National 
Bank employees testified that, when the three were inside 
the bank, one stood near the door holding two guns, while 
the other two jumped over the bank counter and took 
money from tellers' drawers. Video footage taken by the 
bank's security cameras confirmed the basic details of 
these accounts. 
 
The prosecution's primary witnesses were Sergeant Gary 
Gubbei and one of Mr. Mathis's alleged co-conspirators, Mr. 
Gantt. Sergeant Gubbei testified that, on the morning of 
October 14, he responded to a radio dispatch describing the 
robbery and the getaway vehicle. Soon thereafter, Sergeant 
Gubbei spotted a black Jeep Cherokee with an African- 
American driver in the opposing lane of traffic; Sergeant 
Gubbei turned and gave chase. After a period of pursuit, 
the Jeep left the highway and drove onto a grass median, 
where the vehicle apparently stalled and coasted to a halt. 
Three men exited the Jeep while it was still moving--the 
driver first, then a forward passenger, then a rear 
passenger--and escaped over a guardrail on the highway's 
far side. The forward passenger, while stumbling over the 
guardrail, dropped a black bag containing money. The rear 
passenger carried a gun in his right hand as he exited the 
Jeep and held the weapon near his head, pointing toward 
the sky. The rear passenger momentarily looked back at 
Sergeant Gubbei before running away, and Sergeant 
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Gubbei testified at trial that he was able, based on that 
brief view, to identify the fleeing man as Mr. Mathis. 
Sergeant Gubbei also testified that, at 1:00 p.m. on October 
15, he selected Mr. Mathis's picture from an eight-picture 
photographic array as depicting one of the Jeep's 
occupants. 
 
Mr. Gantt, who pled guilty in this case, testified that he 
and Mr. Mathis jointly robbed a total of twelve banks, 
including the Sun National Bank, and that seven of these 
robberies, including that of the Sun National Bank, also 
involved Mr. Seaberry. Mr. Gantt further testified that these 
seven robberies shared other characteristics: The robbers 
covered their faces with masks; the robbed banks were 
located near Camden, New Jersey; and Mr. Mathis often 
stood as an armed guard, while Mr. Gantt and Mr. Seaberry 
vaulted the counters and stole cash from the drawers. 
 
In describing the Sun National Bank robbery, Mr. Gantt 
testified that Mr. Mathis, Mr. Seaberry, and he parked a 
Jeep at the rear of the bank's parking lot, donned face 
masks, ran alongside the bank, and entered through the 
front of the building. Mr. Gantt stated that he and Mr. 
Seaberry jumped over the tellers' counters and placed 
money from the drawers in a bag they were carrying, while 
Mr. Mathis stood guard with two pistols. The three then 
returned to the Jeep. Mr. Seaberry drove, Mr. Gantt rode in 
the forward passenger's seat, and Mr. Mathis rode in the 
rear passenger's seat. Mr. Gantt testified that, as the Jeep 
tried to evade a pursuing police cruiser (apparently driven 
by Sergeant Gubbei), Mr. Seaberry tried to drive over the 
highway's grass divider, causing the Jeep's engine to stall, 
and the three men exited while the vehicle was still rolling 
forward. Mr. Gantt stated that he and Mr. Mathis jumped 
over the highway guardrail and, without Mr. Seaberry, 
escaped after stealing a nearby delivery truck. At trial, 
Detective Jeff Hoch testified that he arrested Mr. Seaberry 
near an apartment complex beside the highway. 
 
II. Grounds for Appeal 
 
A. Evidence of Uncharged Robberies 
 
At trial, the government moved in limine to admit into 
evidence testimony from Mr. Gantt concerning eleven 
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robberies that he and Mr. Mathis had jointly undertaken 
prior to the Sun National Bank robbery. The government 
first addressed the testimony's admissibility under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which states: 
 
       Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
       admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
       to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
       however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
       proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
       knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident 
       . . . . 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). According to the government, the 
disputed evidence was admissible, inter alia, to show Mr. 
Mathis's familiarity with Mr. Gantt and Mr. Seaberry prior 
to the charged offense and to show the group's modus 
operandi for robbing banks. In response, Mr. Mathis 
conceded that Rule 404(b) was satisfied, but he claimed 
that Mr. Gantt's testimony presented a risk of unfair 
prejudice that substantially outweighed its probative value 
and was therefore barred by Rule 403, which provides: 
 
       Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
       probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
       danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
       misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
       delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
       cumulative evidence. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
 
The District Court admitted Mr. Gantt's testimony into 
evidence, holding, as a preliminary matter, that Rule 404(b) 
was satisfied because the testimony's description of 
uncharged acts was linked to charged conduct by"[t]he 
same general area, the same general time period, the intent 
entering into the conspiracy, the background of this, the 
familiarity [of] one with the other, the agreement among 
everyone and the knowledge with regard to how to carry out 
bank robberies." With respect to Rule 403, the District 
Court acknowledged that there was "prejudice in this 
evidence," but it also found that the evidence"possess[ed] 
great probative value." Mr. Mathis's defense was one of 
mistaken identity, and the District Court found that"[t]his 
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evidence from a co-defendant links him directly to the 
crime, directly with the evidence of the police officer who 
will testify. . . . I find it is not unfairly prejudicial looking at 
what the Government must prove, what is available to the 
Government and who is going to be offering the testimony." 
When Mr. Gantt completed his testimony regarding the 
uncharged robberies, the District Court read a jury 
instruction (whose substance is not challenged) limiting use 
of the testimony to showing "defendant's knowledge of the 
crime of bank robbery and . . . his familiarity with the other 
alleged co-conspirators" and to showing "that the robbery of 
Sun National Bank was part of a scheme or plan in which 
the defendant participated."  The District Court stressed 
that the jury could consider such evidence "only for [those] 
limited purposes . . . [and] to use the evidence for any other 
purpose would be improper and violative of your oath." 
 
We review a district court's decision to admit or exclude 
evidence for abuse of discretion, and such discretion is 
construed especially broadly in the context of Rule 403. 
E.g., Hurley v. Atl. Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 110 (3d Cir. 
1999). On appeal, Mr. Mathis claims that Rule 403 should 
have barred the contested portion of Mr. Gantt's testimony 
because "evidence relating to so many other uncharged 
bank robberies" inevitably prejudiced the jury"by 
demonstrating that Mathis had a propensity to rob banks." 
Appellant's Br. at 28. He also claims that such testimony 
was not significantly probative because the government 
"could establish Mathis' identity, or his association to Gantt 
. . . by Sergeant Gubbei's eyewitness identification. . . and 
[by] Steven Gantt's testimony that he was acquainted with 
Mathis and that he . . . robbed the Sun National Bank with 
the defendant." Id. at 30. 
 
With respect to the testimony's risk of prejudice, we agree 
with the District Court that the disputed testimony's 
description of eleven uncharged robberies, in a case seeking 
conviction on only one, entailed some risk of unfair 
prejudice. That is, the jury could well have interpreted Mr. 
Gantt's testimony as proving that Mr. Mathis was a person 
of bad character who deserved punishment independent of 
the government's particular proof regarding the Sun 
National Bank robbery. But in United States v. O'Leary, 739 
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F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1984), this court held that the number of 
uncharged acts alleged, even if disproportionate to the 
number of charged acts, does not alone render admission of 
such evidence an abuse of discretion. The defendant in 
O'Leary was charged with one count of conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and five counts of possession with intent 
to distribute cocaine. Mr. O'Leary claimed that the district 
court erroneously admitted testimony stating that he had 
sold drugs on "[a]bout 20" occasions during the course of 
"[a]bout a year." Id. at 136. We affirmed the conviction, 
finding that the district court had expressly analyzed the 
defendant's Rule 403 challenge and had issued an 
instruction "clearly explaining to the jury the narrow way in 
which to use the evidence," thereby "lessen[ing] any 
possibility of prejudice." Id. Similarly, in the case at bar, the 
District Court explicitly balanced the testimony's probative 
value against its danger of unfair prejudice, and it 
instructed the jury on the permissible uses of Mr. Gantt's 
testimony.1 
 
The chief authority on which Mr. Mathis relies is United 
States v. Hans, 738 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1984), where we 
reversed a defendant's conviction for bank robbery and 
assault during the commission of a bank robbery. The 
testimony in Hans was from an FBI agent, and it described 
the surprising speed with which the defendant became a 
suspect in the case. Such testimony was deemed extremely 
prejudicial because, in context, "the only reasonable 
inference that a reasonable juror could draw from the 
testimony was that Hans was well-known as a bank robber 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Mr. Mathis seeks to distinguish O'Leary  because the witness in that 
case answered relatively few, relatively cursory questions about the 
defendant's previous misconduct, while "the government's examination of 
Gantt regarding the details of the eleven uncharged bank robberies went 
on for 34 pages, and dominated Gantt's trial testimony." Reply Br. at 26. 
We cannot agree that the government's efficiency, or lack thereof, in 
conducting Mr. Gantt's examination significantly determines the 
resultant testimony's prejudicial effect. Here, as in O'Leary, the 
government's questions were sufficient in duration and substance to 
raise the defendant's prior misconduct as an issue, and this fact 
alone--not any claim of "undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence"--is the defendant's asserted basis 
for prejudice. 
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to the Detroit F.B.I." Id. at 94; id.  ("[I]t is difficult to imagine 
testimony more prejudicial than [the] implication that Hans 
was known to the Detroit police as a professional bank 
robber . . . ."). Mr. Mathis has presented no argument that 
Mr. Gantt's testimony implicated the unusual risk of 
prejudice discussed in Hans, and we see no reason to 
believe it did so. Whereas the testimony in Hans generated 
untestable inferences about what was "well-known" by the 
"Detroit F.B.I.," Mr. Gantt testified directly regarding his 
own experience. Thus, Mr. Gantt's testimony was properly 
challengeable, and was in fact challenged, by vigorous 
cross-examination, which significantly mitigated its risk of 
unfair prejudice. Cf. United States v. Gonzalez-Lira, 936 
F.2d 184, 191 (5th Cir. 1991) (finding the prejudicial effect 
caused by evidence of past acts mitigated by the 
opportunity to cross-examine and by a proper limiting 
instruction); United States v. Lynn, 856 F.2d 430, 437 (1st 
Cir. 1988) (finding the risk of prejudice "especially 
distressing" where the defendant "could not . . . cross- 
examine the agent on the reliability of the information"). 
 
With respect to the other part of Rule 403's analysis, the 
District Court found that Mr. Gantt's testimony possessed 
"great probative value." On appeal, the government argues 
that the disputed testimony "was admissible to show the 
familiarity and interrelationship of Mathis, Gantt, and 
Seaberry," thereby tending to prove Mr. Mathis's conspiracy 
count. Appellee's Br. at 53-55. In evaluating this position, 
we take guidance from this court's holding in United States 
v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1988). The defendant in 
Scarfo was convicted of conspiring to extort, and of 
extorting, money from a real estate developer. The district 
court admitted testimony from two of the defendant's co- 
conspirators stating that, prior to the charged extortion, 
they had committed two murders pursuant to the 
defendant's orders. These co-conspirators also testified 
about numerous details of the defendant's "crime family," 
including uncharged murders, briberies, and extortions. On 
appeal, we affirmed the defendant's conviction, holding that 
"[b]ecause the government's case against the defendants 
rested on the testimony of unindicted co-conspirators, 
evidence describing their relationship to the defendants and 
providing background information to illustrate the 
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witnesses' roles in the scheme was properly admitted." Id. 
at 1020. Also, in order for the jury "to realize that [the co- 
conspirators] had been granted immunity for the very 
murders that they asserted Scarfo had ordered" and 
thereby to assess the witnesses' motive for testifying, we 
concluded that such evidence was "essential in the 
government's effort to establish the credibility of its 
disreputable, yet indispensable witness." Id.  
 
The charged conduct here, of course, lacks much of the 
gravity and extensiveness associated with the activities 
described in Scarfo, but the applicable legal principles are 
not so dissimilar. Mr. Mathis was indicted for a conspiracy, 
whose details the government was required to prove, and 
Mr. Gantt was the government's only witness who could 
describe the conspiracy directly. Mr. Gantt's testimony 
regarding the eleven uncharged robberies, if believed by the 
jury, explained both Mr. Gantt's role in the conspiracy and 
his motive for testifying, i.e., to fulfill his plea agreement 
and reduce his sentence. This testimony also tended to 
show that, in addition to their previous associations, Mr. 
Gantt and Mr. Mathis conspired in robbing Sun National 
Bank, on the theory that co-conspirators more often trust 
those with whom they are already intimate. Contrary to Mr. 
Mathis's argument that the disputed testimony was 
unnecessary given other evidence in the case, Mr. Gantt's 
testimony was the only direct evidence offered for the 
purposes listed above. Accordingly, for reasons parallel to 
those in Scarfo, we deem Mr. Gantt's testimony significantly 
probative of Mr. Mathis's involvement in the charged  
conspiracy.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The government also argues that Mr. Gantt's testimony demonstrates 
a common modus operandi. The government's position begins with the 
solid premise that "[a] jury can rationally infer from evidence that the 
defendant committed a prior crime in an unusual and distinctive manner 
and evidence that a second similar crime was committed in the same 
unusual and distinctive manner that the defendant committed the 
second crime." Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 916 (3d 
Cir. 1992). In order to distinguish this type of inference from 
impermissible conclusions based on propensity or bad character, 
however, the admissibility of such evidence critically depends on the 
degree to which the "manner" employed is "unusual and distinctive." 1 
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After reviewing the District Court's explanation for its 
ruling, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court's 
conclusion that the disputed testimony's danger of unfair 
prejudice did not substantially outweigh its probative value. 
Mr. Gantt's testimony about the uncharged robberies 
provided significant background information bolstering the 
charged conspiracy's plausibility, and the risk of prejudice 
attending such evidence was mitigated by the opportunity 
for cross-examination and by the District Court's limiting 
instruction. Thus, we hold that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion by declining to exclude Mr. Gantt's 
testimony. 
 
B. Evidence of Photographic Identification 
 
Before trial, the District Court conducted an evidentiary 
hearing to determine the admissibility of testimony from 
Sergeant Gubbei stating that he saw Mr. Mathis exit the 
Jeep on October 14, 1998, and that he selected Mr. 
Mathis's picture from a photographic array on October 15, 
1998. At that hearing, Sergeant Gubbei testified that he 
chose Mr. Mathis's photograph from an array of eight 
photographs at the Maple Shade police department, and 
Mr. Mathis moved to exclude such testimony because 
Sergeant Gubbei had previously seen an identical 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
McCormick on Evidence 662-63 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) 
("Much more is demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes 
of the same class, such as repeated murders, robberies, or rapes. The 
pattern and characteristics must be so unusual and distinctive as to be 
like a signature.") (footnotes omitted). On this point, Mr. Gantt's 
testimony indicated only that all of the uncharged robberies at issue 
occurred near Camden, New Jersey, within approximately four months of 
one another, and that the robbers wore gloves and masks. Mr. Gantt 
further testified that sometimes his girlfriend waited outside the target 
bank in a car, other times she did not; sometimes one robber acted as 
an armed guard near the bank's door, sometimes not; sometimes the 
robbers would use a stolen getaway car, other times not; sometimes they 
used a .45 caliber handgun, other times a .22 caliber handgun, and 
sometimes they used toy guns or screwdrivers taped to look like guns. 
None of the authorities cited by the government has approved modus 
operandi admissibility based on such inconsistent and generally non- 
distinctive characteristics, and we find the evidence in this case 
insufficient to support such a theory. 
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photograph of Mr. Mathis. Specifically, a Maple Shade 
detective had, roughly one month before the robbery, given 
Sergeant Gubbei materials describing various bank robbery 
suspects. According to Sergeant Gubbei, these materials 
included between thirteen and fifteen pages with 
approximately seven photographs of bank robbery suspects, 
and one of these photographs--virtually identical to that 
later placed in the array--depicted Mr. Mathis. 3 
 
Mr. Mathis argued that admitting this testimony from 
Sergeant Gubbei would violate the Due Process Clause's 
protection against certain suggestive identification 
procedures. In particular, Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 
(1972), held that, for out-of-court identifications, 
"convictions based on eye-witness identification . . . will be 
set aside only if the photographic identification was so 
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 
substantial likelihood of . . . misidentification." Id. at 196- 
97 (internal quotation omitted).4   Biggers further declared 
that likelihood of misidentification should be measured by 
a totality of circumstances including: the witness's initial 
opportunity to view the suspect at the crime scene and 
degree of attention at that time, the witness's level of 
certainty in the disputed identification, the length of time 
between initial viewing and disputed identification, and the 
accuracy of any intervening description of the suspect 
occurring between those two events. Id. at 199-200. 
 
In the present case, Mr. Mathis contended that "the very 
fact of [a] previous viewing" was itself sufficient to establish 
the identification procedure's suggestiveness. He further 
argued that a substantial likelihood of misidentification 
arose both from Sergeant Gubbei's limited opportunity to 
view Mr. Mathis as he fled and from Sergeant Gubbei's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We base much of our analysis on Sergeant Gubbei's testimony 
because the materials themselves, aside from the page containing Mr. 
Mathis's picture, apparently were not introduced into evidence. 
 
4. See also United States v. Emanuele, 51 F.3d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(interpreting later cases as requiring only a "substantial risk of 
misidentification"). 
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degree of attention, which was arguably impaired by other 
people and events he witnessed at that time.5 
 
The government replied that Sergeant Gubbei's testimony 
showed that he had only reviewed the materials containing 
Mr. Mathis's photograph once or twice, immediately after 
receiving them approximately a month before the Sun 
National Bank robbery. Furthermore, Sergeant Gubbei 
stated he had attended most closely to the suspects' modi 
operandorum, not to their photographs. The government 
also noted that Sergeant Gubbei described his view of Mr. 
Mathis's face on October 14 as unobstructed and clear, and 
that he exhibited both a high degree of attention in 
watching the Jeep's occupants disembark and a high level 
of certainty in making his subsequent photographic 
identification. 
 
In denying Mr. Mathis's motion to exclude the testimony, 
the District Court followed this court's two-step process for 
applying Biggers: 
 
       The first question is whether the initial identification 
       procedure was `unnecessarily' . . . suggestive. This 
       inquiry . . . contains two component parts: that 
       concerning the suggestiveness of the identification, and 
       that concerning whether there was some good reason 
       for the failure to resort to less suggestive procedures. If 
       a procedure is found . . . unnecessarily suggestive, the 
       next question is whether the procedure . . . gave rise to 
       such a `substantial likelihood of . . . misidentification' 
       that admitting the identification would be a denial of 
       due process. 
 
United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1389 (3d Cir. 
1991) (internal quotation omitted). The District Court ruled 
that Mr. Mathis did not "initially demonstrate[that] the 
identification was impermissibly suggestive"; the District 
Court then proceeded to find that Sergeant Gubbei's 
identification was reliably based in fact and most likely did 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Mr. Mathis conceded that Biggers's"length of time" factor weighed in 
favor of admitting the evidence, since the contested identification 
occurred just one day after Sergeant Gubbei viewed the Jeep's 
passenger. 
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not result from impermissible suggestion. The District 
Court also found that the "background of the photo of the 
defendant is no darker or lighter than the other photos," 
that the cropped pictures did not reveal any difference in 
the subjects' build, and that the eight men "have the same 
skin tone, have the same facial features, eyes, nose, lip 
shape, [and] facial hair." 
 
We review the District Court's decision for abuse of 
discretion, applying clear error review to its underlying 
factual findings and plenary review to its conclusions 
drawn from such facts. United States v. Emanuele , 51 F.3d 
1123, 1127 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Sumner v. Mata, 455 
U.S. 591, 597 (1982) (discussing the relationship between 
fact and law in the context of pretrial identifications). On 
appeal, both parties have primarily disputed the factual 
reliability of Sergeant Gubbei's identification and whether 
there existed a substantial likelihood of misidentification. 
We affirm, however, based solely on the first part of the 
Stevens test, i.e., the District Court's determination that 
Mr. Mathis did not show the photographic identification to 
be unnecessarily suggestive. See United States v. Hill, 967 
F.2d 226, 230 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting the defendant's 
burden of proof on this issue). 
 
Mr. Mathis contends, as he did before the District Court, 
that "a photographic array created for purposes of a bank 
robbery investigation--which consists of seven photos the 
witness has never seen before, and one photo the witness 
has seen before in the very context of a bank robbery 
investigation--is by its very nature unduly suggestive." 
Appellant's Br. at 14. We disagree, finding that, without 
more, this allegation speaks only to the weight of the 
evidence and, thus, may properly be argued to the jury--as 
Mr. Mathis did in this case. Cf. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 
U.S. 98, 116 (1977) ("[E]vidence with some element of 
untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury mill. 
Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure 
intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has 
some questionable feature."). The unadorned fact that 
Sergeant Gubbei briefly viewed Mr. Mathis's picture, as part 
of a collection of materials distributed one month before the 
robbery, does not demonstrate sufficient suggestiveness to 
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require constitutional inquiry into whether a 
misidentification might have occurred in this case. 
 
Since we have not discovered cases squarely addressing 
facts like these, we are primarily guided by principles 
articulated in Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1380, where the 
defendant's picture was selected from a photographic array 
by two witnesses who had previously identified the 
defendant from a police station's wanted board. That board, 
to which the witnesses were directed by a police officer as 
they filed their complaint, contained eight posters."[F]ive 
were composite sketches, one contained eight small 
photographs, and the other two were both photographs of 
[the defendant]. . . . [O]ne of his photographs was in color, 
whereas the other nine photographs were in black and 
white." Id. at 1388. In evaluating the suggestiveness of the 
board's collection of photographs, we acknowledged that 
the wanted board had "several suggestive attributes": 
"Whereas the posters of Stevens each contained 
photographs, most of the other posters had only composite 
sketches. Stevens's picture, moreover, was the only one 
that appeared twice . . . . Even more bothersome . .. are 
that Stevens's photographs were significantly larger than 
the others, and that Stevens was the only suspect 
portrayed in color." Id. at 1390. Each of these features 
"quite possibly could have drawn the victims' attention to 
Stevens" independent of the witnesses' recollection. Id. But 
we also noted certain considerations that counseled against 
deeming such suggestiveness "unnecessary," including the 
fact that the wanted board had not been "arranged with 
this particular crime in mind. It was, rather, a collection of 
random sketches and photographs that had been 
assembled in order to facilitate chance identifications . . . ." 
Id. Measured against this general law enforcement purpose, 
we also noted that wanted boards often cannot be made 
with photographs of uniform size. Thus, although aspects 
of the particular wanted board in Stevens were 
unnecessarily suggestive, we made significant efforts to 
stress that such displays generally are not so. Compare id. 
with id. at 1390 n.12. 
 
Here, the materials that Sergeant Gubbei received were 
apparently assembled for a law enforcement purpose whose 
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validity is not challenged. Such materials obviously were 
not prepared or circulated with the Sun National Bank 
robbery (which occurred thereafter) in mind, nor, it seems, 
with awareness of influencing any photographic 
identification procedures. Cf. Emanuele, 51 F.3d at 1129 
("[W]e expressly do not require defendant to establish the 
government's state of mind. On the other hand, evidence 
that the government intended and arranged such [a 
potentially suggestive] encounter would be a substantial 
factor in the court's analysis."). We hold that, with respect 
to the present facts, due process does not protect 
defendants like Mr. Mathis from photographic materials 
briefly viewed one month before the disputed identification, 
when such materials are distributed only for purposes of 
general law enforcement. The brief time that elapsed 
between Sergeant Gubbei's receiving the materials and his 
selecting Mr. Mathis's picture from the photographic array 
significantly reduces the level of cognizable "suggestiveness" 
at issue. And though it might seem preferable, or even more 
effective, for police departments to use photographs in 
identification arrays that are different from those used in 
previously distributed suspect data, we do not find an 
identification "unnecessarily suggestive" simply because the 
same photograph, or a very similar photograph, is used in 
both. Law enforcement agencies commonly lack an 
abundance of particular suspects' photographs for use in 
assembling photographic arrays. And even where various 
pictures are on hand, lists are not often kept recording 
which pictures have been circulated to officers who later 
happen to be eyewitnesses. Given such operational 
circumstances--similar to those concerning police station 
wanted boards--we cannot agree that Sergeant Gubbei's 
prior exposure to Mr. Mathis's photograph, in and of itself, 
renders his subsequent identification unnecessarily 
suggestive. 
 
Mr. Mathis further claims that certain "additional 
circumstances" aggravated the suggestiveness of Sergeant 
Gubbei's photographic identification. First, Mr. Mathis 
notes that Sergeant Gubbei chose Mr. Mathis's photograph 
only after Mr. Gantt had already identified one of his co- 
conspirators by name as "Mr. Mathis." We agree with the 
government, however, that there is no evidence to connect 
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Mr. Gantt's identification of Mr. Mathis by name with 
Sergeant Gubbei's identification of Mr. Mathis by image. 
Since the photographic array did not list the names of its 
subjects, Mr. Mathis has failed to show how Mr. Gantt's 
prior identification by name increased the photographic 
array's suggestiveness. Second, Mr. Mathis claims that, of 
the eight photographs in the array, Mr. Mathis's picture 
"quite obviously" was the only one of a "slender and slight" 
build. We review for clear error the District Court's factual 
finding to the contrary, and we find none. The array at 
issue portrays only the subjects' heads and necks, making 
their general physiques very difficult to estimate. Even from 
this limited view, however, it seems that at least two other 
photographs depict men of a build similar to Mr. Mathis's. 
Third, Mr. Mathis claims that the background of Mr. 
Mathis's photograph "was noticeably darker than the 
remaining seven." Upon reviewing the array, we agree and 
find the District Court's finding to the contrary clearly 
erroneous; thus, we must assess the impact of this 
circumstance on the alleged "unnecessary suggestiveness" 
of Sergeant Gubbei's identification. Although Mr. Mathis's 
picture is darker than the others in the array, there are at 
least three other pictures whose backgrounds are 
somewhat dark. Given the current technological state of 
photographic reproduction, and the variety of backgrounds 
evident in the eight pictures at issue, we hold that the 
slightly darker background of Mr. Mathis's picture did not 
significantly contribute to the array's unnecessary 
suggestiveness. See United States v. Burdeau, 168 F.3d 
352, 357 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
In sum, we find that Sergeant Gubbei's photographic 
identification was not "unnecessarily suggestive" to the 
degree required by Biggers. Due process does not mandate 
the removal of testimony like Sergeant Gubbei's from the 
jury's consideration, even if such evidence presents (as 
much admissible evidence does) a risk of misidentification. 
On the contrary, such modest levels of "suggestiveness," 
which are not deemed constitutionally "unnecessary," 
speak only to the evidence's ultimate reliability and should 
therefore be argued for authoritative appraisal to the 
factfinder. On the current record, we find no abuse of 
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discretion in the District Court's decision to admit Sergeant 
Gubbei's testimony into evidence. 
 
C. Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitnesses 
 
After the government had presented its witnesses, Mr. 
Mathis sought to present testimony from Dr. Geoffrey 
Loftus regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifications 
such as Sergeant Gubbei's. The District Court conducted 
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether such 
testimony was admissible. During that hearing, Dr. Loftus 
testified that he had received a doctoral degree from 
Samford University in clinical psychology and had served as 
a professor at the University of Washington for over twenty- 
five years. His doctoral dissertation concerned humans' 
ability to recall and recognize pictures from memory, and 
his subsequent studies in the field of human perception 
and scientific methodology were published as books and 
professional journal articles. Based on these and other 
academic credentials, the District Court qualified Dr. Loftus 
as an expert in the field of human perception and memory. 
 
Dr. Loftus then proffered testimony on four topics 
concerning the operation of human memory: (i) the 
preconditions for forming accurate memories, (ii) the 
confounding impact of "double identification" or "post-event 
information," (iii) the relationship between individuals' 
confidence in describing memories and the accuracy of 
such memories, and (iv) potential disruptions caused by 
"weapons focus." With respect to memory formation, Dr. 
Loftus observed that, among other circumstances, the 
brevity of one's visual exposure to an object tends to cause 
an incomplete memory, which might later be especially 
susceptible to biasing influences.  Dr. Loftus described 
"double identification" as a problem in determining whether 
one's memory derives from one of two or more possible 
visual exposures to an object. According to Dr. Loftus, a 
witness's recognizing someone, under circumstances 
similar to those described by Sergeant Gubbei, could derive 
either from the witness's actually having seen the 
recognized person or from a previous exposure to that 
person's photograph. Dr. Loftus indicated, citing scientific 
studies, that when one encounters a remembered image 
along with "post-event information" suggesting a particular 
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context from which the image might be remembered (such 
as the Sun National Bank robbery's photographic array), 
such post-event information can become incorporated with 
the original memory, creating an inaccurately 
"remembered" association between the image and its 
source. Regarding witnesses' confidence in their 
identifications, Dr. Loftus stated that "the correspondence 
between confidence and accuracy is, at best, about 25 
percent." He further explained that when conditions 
attending the recalled memories are poor, "when, for 
example, there is only a brief duration . . . [or] incorrect 
post-event information introduced to the [observer], it's 
under those circumstances that the relation between 
confidence and [accurate] memory is zero." And on the topic 
of "weapons focus," Dr. Loftus discussed studies finding 
that the presence of a dangerous weapon can weaken one's 
ability to recall other aspects of a remembered scene, 
including individuals present therein. 
 
In applying these principles to hypothetical questions 
intended to simulate the facts of this case, Dr. Loftus stated 
that "it's two to three times as likely that the identification 
in the photo montage was made based on seeing the 
photograph four weeks earlier than it was based on seeing 
the individual" who fled on October 14, 1998. Dr. Loftus 
also concluded that, if the photo array did not actually 
depict the person who exited the Jeep, that array itself 
would constitute incorrect post-event information. And 
such misinformation might have caused Sergeant Gubbei's 
identification of Mr. Mathis to reflect the man seen in the 
previously viewed photograph, who was observed under 
conditions favorable to memory formation, rather than the 
man seen running away, who was observed under 
conditions unfavorable to memory formation. Dr. Loftus 
further opined that the officer's confidence in this 
identification and the factual accuracy thereof would have 
a probabilistic relationship of "essentially zero" under such 
circumstances. 
 
Mr. Mathis moved to admit the foregoing testimony into 
evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which 
provides: 
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       If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
       will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
       or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
       an expert . . . may testify thereto in the form of an 
       opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon 
       sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product 
       of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness 
       has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
       facts of the case. 
 
Fed. R. Evid. 702. In particular, Mr. Mathis argued that Dr. 
Loftus's testimony was based on generally accepted 
scientific methods and data, that there was a direct relation 
between the proffered testimony and the factual issues in 
dispute, and that the proffered testimony would"refute 
common assumptions about the reliability of eye witness 
identification testimony that will assist the jury to weigh 
the credibility of Sergeant Gubbei's eye witness 
identification." 
 
The District Court excluded Dr. Loftus's testimony, but it 
ratified Dr. Loftus's qualifications as an expert and 
dismissed all methodological challenges to the studies he 
cited. The following constitutes the District Court's 
explanation of its ruling: 
 
       I'm particularly concerned with [Rule] 403 and I'm 
       inclined not to allow this testimony. I believe this 
       testimony has the probability of confusing and 
       misleading the jury. I find no problem with his 
       qualifications. Obviously he is qualified in this area. 
       The debate over the differences in the studies is an 
       interesting academic debate. As [defense counsel] 
       points out, however, there is only one [w]ay to run the 
       studies. You can't run them in a live situation, they 
       have to be in a controlled situation. That does not give 
       me pause. 
 
       What does give me pause is the fact that I believe that 
       in point of fact, there is a probability that there will be 
       unfair prejudice here. The aura of reliability that's 
       attached to an expert witness, I believe, is significant. 
       Listening to this expert, it seems to me, that the 
       testimony itself has the potential, if not controlling 
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       probability of confusing the jury. There is no issue in 
       this case about cross-racial identification. There is no 
       issue about stress. They were the two more compelling 
       issues about which I was concerned. 
 
       The issues concerning the focus at the time of the 
       chase and when the defendant exited the vehicle are 
       subject to the jury. The defense in this case had an 
       untrammeled opportunity to cross and did, in fact, 
       cross the police officer vigorously on that area. The 
       testimony is, I think clear. Whether the jury accepts it 
       or not, how the jury accepts it is clearly within their 
       province. I do not see how this evidence will do 
       anything, other than to confuse and mislead the jury. 
       I decline the invitation to admit. 
 
1. Admissibility of Dr. Loftuss Testimony 
 
We review the District Court's decision to exclude Dr. 
Loftus's testimony for abuse of discretion. General Electric 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997); Oddi v. Ford Motor 
Corp., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000). Although the 
District Court explicitly rested its decision on Rule 403's 
standards for probative value and prejudice, the 
government on appeal invokes only Rule 702's prescriptions 
regarding expert testimony. We will address both rules, 
beginning with Rule 702. 
 
This court has construed Rule 702 as embodying "three 
distinct substantive restrictions on the admission of expert 
testimony: qualifications, reliability, and fit." Elcock v. 
Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 741 (3d Cir. 2000). Only "fit" is 
contested here; the government acknowledges that Dr. 
Loftus is a properly qualified expert and that his methods, 
principles, and data are of a sufficiently reliable scientific 
character. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 
509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993) (discussing factors that may 
be considered in assessing scientific reliability); In re Paoli 
R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 742 n.8 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(same). 
 
Rule 702's fit requirement derives from the textual 
provision that "scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Fed. R. Evid. 702. 
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The requirement is "not intended to be a high one," 
however, Oddi, 234 F.3d at 145, and its principle is not 
dissimilar to the Federal Rules' general provision that, 
unless otherwise specified, "[a]ll relevant evidence is 
admissible" and "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." Fed. R. Evid. 402; Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (interpreting Rule 702 as 
requiring all expert testimony to be relevant and reliable). 
Compare United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1230 
(3d Cir. 1985) (noting "the liberal standard of admissibility 
mandated by Rule 702"), with Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 
(noting that Rule 402's "basic standard of relevance is a 
liberal one"). See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592 
(describing inquiry under Rule 702 as a determination "of 
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that 
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the 
facts in issue"). 
 
The clearest guide for interpreting Rule 702 in the 
context of this case is United States v. Downing , 753 F.2d 
at 1226, wherein this court, in 1985, first considered the 
admissibility of expert testimony concerning human 
memory and eyewitness testimony. In Downing, we 
discussed certain of the rationales advanced by other 
courts of appeals in prior years for excluding such 
testimony, including notions that relevant issues could 
adequately be raised through cross-examination and 
common sense, that such testimony usurps the jury's 
function, and that such evidence would lead to an unduly 
confusing "battle" of experts. Id. at 1229-30 & n.4. In 
explaining why we found those rationales unpersuasive, we 
disavowed skepticism of such testimony as a matter of 
principle, and we remanded for the district court to apply 
Rule 702's "helpfulness test." We described this test, in 
pertinent part, as follows: "[A]dmission depends upon the 
`fit,' i.e., upon a specific proffer showing that scientific 
research has established that particular features of the 
eyewitness identifications involved may have impaired the 
accuracy of those identifications." Id. at 1226. 
 
In the case at bar, the government challenges the fit of 
Dr. Loftus's testimony in three respects. First, on the 
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subject of "double identification" and "post-event 
information," the government claims that Dr. Loftus's 
testimony did not pertain to the present facts because, 
according to Dr. Loftus's own theory, Sergeant Gubbei 
viewed Mr. Mathis's face only once, as part of the suspect 
materials, before selecting from the photographic array. 
Thus, the government claims, this case did not involve any 
"double" identification. Appellee Br. at 36. The government 
also argues that there was no post-event information 
"between the visual identification of Mathis on the day of 
the robbery and the photo array identification." Id. at 38. 
Each of these arguments misconstrues the substance of Dr. 
Loftus's testimony. As explained supra, double 
identification theory indicates that a person confronting an 
image may have a firm memory of having previously viewed 
the image, but may not have a similarly firm memory of 
when that viewing occurred. Given the suboptimal 
conditions for memory formation during the Jeep incident, 
and given the relative calm under which Sergeant Gubbei 
had previously seen a photograph of Mr. Mathis, Dr. Loftus 
testified that Sergeant Gubbei might have recalled Mr. 
Mathis's face from that previously viewed photograph 
but--because he was searching the photographic array in 
order to identify the Jeep's passenger--he might have 
wrongly associated the recalled photographic image with 
the fleeing robbery suspect. Contrary to the government's 
misunderstanding, the two pertinent "identifications" were 
the view of the suspect materials and the view of the man 
who fled. 
 
Furthermore, according to Dr. Loftus, the photographic 
array constituted potentially inaccurate post-event 
information, which might have influenced Sergeant Gubbei 
wrongly to associate Mr. Mathis's image with the Sun 
National Robbery.6 Dr. Loftus also was of the view that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The government argues that the photographic array was not distortive 
post-event information if, as we have now held, the array was not 
unconstitutionally suggestive. As our earlier discussion makes clear, 
however, the standards of "unnecessary suggestiveness" for admissibility 
under Biggers simply have no bearing on Dr. Loftus's testimony. A 
photographic identification may be highly suggestive as a psychological 
matter and still be deemed legally admissible as a constitutional one. A 
determination that such an identification is admissible poses no greater 
barrier to attack by expert testimony than it does to cross-examination. 
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Sergeant Gubbei's act of choosing Mr. Mathis's photograph 
from the several photographs constituting the photo array 
was itself post-event information that could have influenced 
Sergeant Gubbei's face-to-face identification of Mr. Mathis 
at trial. Dr. Loftus argued that these pieces of post-event 
information may have distorted each of Sergeant Gubbei's 
purported identifications of Mr. Mathis. Given the close 
correspondence between these aspects of Dr. Loftus's 
testimony and the factual issues disputed at trial, we 
conclude that the proffered evidence did not lack 
evidentiary fit for purposes of Rule 702. 
 
Second, the government contends that Dr. Loftus's 
observations with respect to the weak relationship between 
an eyewitness's testimonial confidence and the accuracy of 
such testimony did not fit because, in the government's 
view, Dr. Loftus presented "nothing more than a general 
thesis on the correlation between confidence and accuracy." 
Id. at 44. As an initial matter, this characterization of the 
evidence appears mistaken. Dr. Loftus testified about the 
relationship between confidence and accuracy under 
specific circumstances similar to those in this case: an 
identification based on a brief view, in the presence of a 
deadly weapon, and several potentially distracting events 
on-going. Also, Sergeant Gubbei's testimony on direct 
examination indirectly implicated his confidence as an 
element supporting the credibility of his identification. In 
describing how he selected Mr. Mathis's photograph, 
Sergeant Gubbei was asked, "Q: Did you have any 
hesitation in determining those individuals [Mr. Mathis and 
Mr. Gantt]? A: No, I didn't." Later, after already having 
described his choice of Mr. Mathis's photograph from the 
array, Sergeant Gubbei was again asked, "Q: Sitting here 
today Sergeant, was your identification of Keith Mathis 
from the photo array based upon your viewing him the day 
before, following the bank robbery or on the photograph 
that you had been shown in the packet? A: I identified him 
from the incident that took place from the Sun National on 
the day before." The level of confidence underlying Sergeant 
Gubbei's identification came into more explicit focus during 
cross-examination: 
 
       Q: [A]s we sit here today, is it even possible that the 
       identification you made of Mr. Mathis in that photo 
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       array was based not on seeing him exiting that Jeep 
       but on the previous opportunity to observe that 
       photograph. 
 
       A: No, I'm positive by him getting out of the vehicle 
       . . . . 
 
       Q: Your answer is it's not even a possibility? 
 
       A: I guess there is a remote possibility, but I'm positive 
       of the identification when he exited the vehicle. 
 
Where Sergeant Gubbei testified so directly regarding his 
high confidence in the disputed identification, it seems 
clear that Dr. Loftus's testimony did address, for purposes 
of Rule 702, pertinent factual disputes in the case. See 
Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1400 (reaching an identical conclusion 
where the defendant sought "[t]o rebut the natural 
assumption that [the witnesses'] strong expression of 
confidence indicates an unusually reliable identification"). 
 
Third, the government argues that Dr. Loftus's opinions 
about "weapons focus" were not relevant to the present 
case because Sergeant Gubbei was a police officer who was 
quite accustomed to firearms, and because the relevant gun 
was pointed into the air, not at Sergeant Gubbei. Such 
arguments may be useful topics for cross-examination, but 
we do not find them persuasive grounds for exclusion 
under Rule 702. Dr. Loftus expressed the view that the 
phenomenon of weapons focus derives both from the 
infrequency with which most individuals view deadly 
weapons and from a survival instinct that draws one's 
attention to potentially threatening objects. He pointed out 
that various studies, performed by him and by other 
scientists, showed that a weapon's presence in a scene 
substantially affects subjects' ability to recall individuals in 
that scene. He further pointed out that close physical 
proximity of a weapon to another object (e.g. , the face of the 
Jeep's passenger) would not appreciably reduce the 
weapon's distortive influence on a witness's memory. 
 
With respect to Sergeant Gubbei's being a police officer, 
Dr. Loftus acknowledged that one's degree of familiarity or 
unfamiliarity with the weapon at issue generally would 
affect the practical impact of weapons focus. But Dr. Loftus 
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also noted that the primary study on which he relied 
involved a knife, which, in his view, was an adequately 
familiar object for most people. Moreover, Dr. Loftus 
specifically rejected any notion that police officers would be 
immune to the psychological principles he described. With 
respect to the particular location of the gun, Dr. Loftus 
indicated that psychological studies inevitably take place in 
secure environments; thus, all of the cited studies assumed 
observers who were actually safe from the weapon at issue. 
He observed that the "survival" impetus for weapons focus 
would, in real life situations, likely be even higher than the 
cited studies indicated. Thus, we cannot agree with the 
government's suggestion that Dr. Loftus's expert opinions 
regarding weapons focus were not relevant for purposes of 
Rule 702. 
 
Having concluded that the government's arguments for 
exclusion under Rule 702 cannot succeed, we turn now to 
Rule 403. As an initial matter, "[w]e are mindful that a trial 
court is in a far better position than an appellate court to 
strike the sensitive balance dictated by Rule 403. When a 
trial court engages in such a balancing process and 
articulates on the record the rationale for its conclusion, its 
conclusion should rarely be disturbed." Pinney, 967 F.2d at 
918; see also Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242-43 (noting Rule 
403's important role in assessing whether expert 
testimony's probative value is "substantially outweighed by 
other dangers, e.g., confusion of the issue or waste of 
time"). But when a district court does not explain its ruling, 
and no adequate explanation can be gleaned from the 
record, appellate courts often have little choice but to 
undertake such evaluation themselves. See e.g. , United 
States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting 
that when district courts fail to explain their rulings under 
Rule 403, "we are able to perform this balancing here, 
[though] other cases may require remand . . . or even . . . 
a new trial"); United States v. Himelwright , 42 F.3d 777, 
785 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
We find it difficult to accord the customary degree of 
deference to the District Court's discretion in this case 
because the District Court explained its ruling with little 
more than a series of conclusions: 
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       [T]his testimony has the probability of confusing and 
       misleading the jury. . . . [T]here is a probability that 
       there will be unfair prejudice here. The aura of 
       reliability that's attached to an expert witness, I 
       believe, is significant. Listening to this expert, it seems 
       to me, that the testimony itself has the potential, if not 
       controlling probability of confusing the jury. . . . 
       [Sergeant Gubbei's] testimony is, I think, clear. 
       Whether the jury accepts it or not, how the jury 
       accepts it is clearly within their province. I do not see 
       how this evidence will do anything, other than to 
       confuse and mislead the jury. 
 
The District Court clearly expressed concern with"[t]he 
aura of reliability that's attached to an expert 
witness"--which is one reason for district courts' 
"gatekeeping function" in assessing expert testimony under 
Rule 702. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 594. There is no 
suggestion, however, that such an aura of reliability was 
unwarranted in this case or, to be more precise, that it was 
unfairly prejudicial. From the record, it seems that Dr. 
Loftus was an extremely qualified, experienced academic 
presenting opinions on topics near the heart of his 
expertise. Moreover, Dr. Loftus's conclusions seem closely 
tied to empirical studies whose reliability is not impeached, 
and he explained the bases for these studies at apparently 
appropriate length. In short, we see no reason to believe 
that Dr. Loftus's aura of reliability reflected anything other 
than his actual reliability as an expert witness. With 
respect to the District Court's concern with "confusing and 
misleading the jury" and "unfair prejudice," we are unable 
to discern from these references, any more than from our 
own review of the record, how such problems might arise. 
 
The government's oral argument before the District Court 
also fails to reveal any valid basis for exclusion under Rule 
403. The government focused on two contentions. First, it 
claimed that the studies cited by Dr. Loftus did not 
sufficiently match the circumstances of this case. The 
District Court rejected this position, holding that such 
disputes "did not give [him] pause," and the government 
has conceded this issue on appeal. 
 
Second, the government stated that: 
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       [T]he problem that bothers me most, your Honor, is the 
       danger of overwhelming the jury. When we gave this 
       witness a hypothetical that was slightly--you know, 
       everyone in this courtroom knows the facts better than 
       I do, but [it] sounded to me slightly tinged toward the 
       defense version of the offense, the witness stated as a 
       fact that the sergeant would not remember accurately. 
       When I gave him the version that was a little bit closer 
       to what I believe the facts to be and the Government 
       version, he stated as a fact that his conclusion would 
       be very different under those facts. So what he's doing 
       is telling the jury the answer instead of allowing the 
       jury to determine the facts for themselves. Any 
       hypothetical that sets forth those facts is likely to have 
       a serious effect on the jury's memory of the testimony 
       rather than allowing the jury to decide what the jury's 
       going to decide. 
 
The full significance of this language is not clear. In part, 
the objection apparently derives from the fact that Dr. 
Loftus's answers regarding Sergeant Gubbei's memory 
changed when the hypotheses under consideration were 
altered regarding, for example, the number of seconds 
Sergeant Gubbei saw the fleeing man's face and the 
attention Sergeant Gubbei paid to the distributed suspect 
materials. Some might view such a change in an expert's 
analysis as the reward of a successful cross-examination; it 
seems hard to view such variation as a basis for excluding 
the testimony under Rule 403. The government did not 
demonstrate, and has not done so now, how this dimension 
of Dr. Loftus's testimony tended to cause any articulable 
degree of unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay. 
 
Another aspect of the government's objection stems from 
a concern, which the District Court seemingly shared, that 
Dr. Loftus's testimony might usurp the jury's function. 
Insofar as this argument constitutes a general attack on 
expert testimony concerning eyewitness identifications, 
such issues are largely resolved by Downing. See id. at 
1229-30 & n.4. Similar to other types of expert witnesses, 
who might testify about the flaws of a computerized filing 
system or the proper interpretation of satellite photographs, 
experts who apply reliable scientific expertise to juridically 
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pertinent aspects of the human mind and body should 
generally, absent explicable reasons to the contrary, be 
welcomed by federal courts, not turned away. Cf. United 
States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 311-12 & n.1 (6th Cir. 
2000) (describing a judicial trend toward, and an 
empirically supported need for, accepting expert testimony 
about eyewitness identification). In this case, Dr. Loftus 
made quite clear that he did not intend to tell the jury 
whether Sergeant Gubbei was lying or telling the truth. Like 
more typical sorts of expert witnesses, Dr. Loftus attempted 
to provide information that, if itself deemed credible, might 
cause the jury to evaluate Sergeant Gubbei's testimony in 
a different light. 
 
In analyzing for ourselves whether the four components 
of Dr. Loftus's testimony7 were admissible, we follow 
standards set forth in United States v. Stevens , which is 
also discussed supra in Part II.B. In Stevens, the defendant 
proffered expert testimony on six topics: "(1) the accuracy of 
cross-racial identifications; (2) the effect of weapon focus on 
identifications; (3) the effect of stress on identifications; (4) 
the suggestiveness of the wanted board [from which the 
defendant was initially identified]; (5) the relation back of 
subsequent identifications to the initial identification; and 
(6) the lack of correlation between confidence and accuracy 
in eyewitness identifications." 935 F.2d at 1397. The 
district court permitted expert testimony on the first three, 
but excluded testimony on the remainder. 
 
On appeal, the Stevens court affirmed the exclusion of 
proffered testimony regarding the wanted board's 
"suggestiveness," in deference to the district court's 
determination that " `[t]he fact that there are two pictures 
. . . of the same person and one [is] in color, I think[,] . . 
. is certainly apparent [to] the jury . . . for the jury to make 
its own determination.' " Id. at 1399; cf. United States v. 
Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 212 (3d Cir. 1999) ("We have upheld 
the exclusion of expert testimony when that testimony 
ventures into areas in which the jury needs no aid or 
illumination."). Similarly, in this case, Dr. Loftus's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Memory formation, double identification and post-event information, 
the relationship between confidence and accuracy, and weapons focus. 
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testimony--claiming that more accurate memories are 
produced by objects that are viewed for longer periods of 
time--is not the type of information that, in and of itself, 
would warrant exposition by an expert witness; thus, we 
concur in the District Court's decision to exclude such 
testimony under Rule 403.8 
 
Stevens's expert testimony regarding "relation back" 
apparently explained that "once a witness makes an 
identification, he or she will tend to stick with that initial 
choice at subsequent photographic arrays or lineups, even 
if it was erroneous." Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1399. Such 
evidence closely resembles the part of Dr. Loftus's 
testimony on "double identification" and "post-event 
information" that explained how, after Sergeant Gubbei had 
already selected Mr. Mathis's picture from the array, his in- 
court identification was likely to be consistent therewith, 
regardless of any actual memory of the underlying events. 
In Stevens, we affirmed the exclusion of expert testimony 
on this topic because we found the testimony "rather 
pedestrian" and "susceptible of elucidation without 
specialized knowledge." Id. at 1399-1400. We are bound to 
reach a parallel conclusion here; hence, we affirm the 
exclusion of Dr. Loftus's testimony on this subject. 
 
Another portion of Dr. Loftus's discussion of "double 
identification," however, was significantly more complex 
than the testimony at issue in Stevens. In particular, Dr. 
Loftus described studies in which subjects remembered 
having seen an image, but, upon being asked to associate 
that image with one of two times they might possibly have 
seen it, the subjects often "remembered" inaccurately. Dr. 
Loftus further explained how Sergeant Gubbei might have 
clearly remembered Mr. Mathis's face from having 
previously seen a photograph of Mr. Mathis, but might have 
confidently and incorrectly associated that memory with the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We do not mean to bar, by this determination, the strong possibility 
that parts of Dr. Loftus's account of memory formation might have been 
properly admissible as a necessary precursor, or ancillary, to other 
admissible testimony regarding memory. Our ruling merely indicates 
that such testimony, in and of itself, does not necessarily surmount the 
barrier of Rule 403. 
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previous day's fleeing suspect. Dr. Loftus indicated that 
such a misidentification was peculiarly likely in 
circumstances where one possible event-memory 
association (the previously viewed photograph) involved 
favorable conditions for memory formation and involved the 
same visual medium as the image to be identified (a 
photograph), whereas the other event-memory association 
(the robbers' escape) involved unfavorable memory 
conditions and a different visual medium (three- 
dimensional observation). We believe that testimony of this 
sort, with its accompanying level of scientific detail, would 
not simply duplicate jurors' intuitions or common sense, 
and such principles seem difficult to establish indirectly 
through cross-examination. Accordingly, we find that the 
District Court abused its discretion in excluding such 
testimony. 
 
The third type of testimony analyzed in Stevens  
concerned the relationship between an eyewitness's 
confidence and the accuracy of a resultant identification. 
Dr. Loftus opined on this same topic in the present case, 
stating that the correspondence between confidence and 
accuracy is "at best, about 25 percent" and, under 
circumstances like these, is "essentially zero." In Stevens, 
we held that such information was sufficiently illuminative 
and susceptible to scientific expertise that exclusion was 
unacceptable under "the liberal standard of admissibility of 
Rule 702" and Rule 403. Id. at 1400-01. In the present 
case, the government objects that Stevens cannot "mean 
that [any time] an eyewitness has confidence in his 
identification, a defendant is automatically entitled to 
present testimony that confidence has little or no 
correlation to accuracy." Appellee's Br. at 43. We agree that 
Stevens did not establish such a universally applicable rule, 
and we also decline to do so here. As the government 
correctly notes, analysis under Rules 702 and 403 is fact- 
intensive and case-specific. That said, however, Stevens did 
hold that, when expert testimony of this character satisfies 
the reliability and fit requirements of Rule 702, and when 
there is no countervailing rationale for excluding the 
evidence under Rule 403, the evidence must be admitted. 
In light of our findings regarding this evidence's probative 
value and our inability to discover any offsetting prejudice, 
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confusion, or delay, we hold that the District Court abused 
its discretion in failing to admit Dr. Loftus's testimony on 
the relationship between eyewitness confidence and 
accuracy. 
 
The final topic discussed by Dr. Loftus was "weapons 
focus." In Stevens, this issue was not before us because the 
District Court had admitted expert testimony on the 
subject. In light of the principles decided in Stevens, as well 
as those discussed supra, we find that Dr. Loftus's 
proposed testimony regarding weapons focus should have 
been admitted into evidence. The government argues that a 
jury does not need expert testimony to learn "the idea that 
one might be distracted by a weapon." Appellee's Br. at 34. 
But Dr. Loftus's testimony was not limited to such a narrow 
scope. In combination, the studies he discussed indicated 
that the presence of weapons weakened memories of other 
aspects of an observed scene, even when such weapons 
posed no immediate threat, and even when those weapons' 
images might be located quite near the object later to be 
identified. We find that the degree and scope of memory 
distortion that, according to Dr. Loftus, a weapon typically 
causes for eyewitnesses are not matters that would 
necessarily be apparent to jurors. And, just as with the 
other admissible aspects of Dr. Loftus's testimony, it is 
difficult to comprehend how weapons' destructive effect on 
memory might be elucidated through cross-examination. 
Especially if Dr. Loftus is correct that witnesses 
remain confident of their identifications even when those 
identifications are inaccurate, eyewitnesses cannot be 
expected--even under the most skilled 
questioning--explicitly to recall or nonverbally to reveal the 
extent to which their remembered impressions might have 
been distorted or undermined. We find that, in this case, 
and on this record, it was an abuse of discretion not to 
admit such testimony into evidence. 
 
D. Harmless Error 
 
Our final step is to consider whether the District Court's 
error in excluding parts of Dr. Loftus's testimony was 
legally harmless. See 28 U.S.C.A. S 2111 ("In the hearing of 
any appeal[,] . . . the court shall give judgment after an 
examination of the record without regard to errors or 
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defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties."); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a); 
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). This court 
has held that a non-constitutional error committed at trial 
does not warrant reversal in circumstances where"it is 
highly probable that the error did not contribute to the 
judgment." United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 241 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). And the applicable 
standard for " `[h]igh probability' requires that we have a 
sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the 
defendants. We may not simply conclude that it is more 
likely than not that the error was harmless. On the other 
hand, we may be firmly convinced that the error was 
harmless without disproving every `reasonable possibility' of 
prejudice." United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 220 n.2 
(3d Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted). The burden of 
demonstrating such high probability lies with the 
government, United States v. Adams, 2001 WL 543711 at 
*4 (3d Cir. May 23, 2001), but we retain our established 
authority to affirm on any ground supported by the record, 
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); 
Alexander Hamilton Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gov't of Virgin 
Islands, 757 F.2d 534, 547-58 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
The government contends that, even if (as we now have 
found) the District Court wrongly failed to admit certain 
testimony from Dr. Loftus, Mr. Mathis's conviction should 
be affirmed because the government presented other 
evidence that constituted more "compelling evidence of 
Mathis's guilt than Sergeant Gubbei's identification." 
Appellee's Br. at 47. In particular, the government relies on 
testimony from Mr. Gantt, who described his cooperation 
with Mr. Mathis in robbing the Sun National Bank and 
eleven other banks. According to the government, Mr. 
Gantt's "tremendous opportunity to observe, speak to, and 
identify Mathis was damning and far outweighed Sergeant 
Gubbei's testimony in importance." Id. Mr. Mathis replies 
by challenging Mr. Gantt's credibility, both noting that Mr. 
Gantt lied to police after his arrest and arguing that Mr. 
Gantt's plea agreement provided a motive to lie if doing so 
might advance Mr. Mathis's prosecution. In Mr. Mathis's 
view, the government wrongly urges this court to"speculate 
 
                                32 
  
that the jury would have convicted defendant . . . had it 
. . . heard Dr. Loftus' testimony . . . . [T]he jury may well 
have concluded that the government had failed to bear its 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that . .. 
[Mathis] participated in the Sun National Bank robbery." 
Reply Br. at 23. In essence, the government asks this court, 
apparently as a matter of first instance, to weigh the import 
of Mr. Gantt's testimony against that of Sergeant Gubbei's 
testimony, while Mr. Mathis asks us not to "speculate" 
about what the jury would have done if Dr. Loftus had 
testified. 
 
We find that neither of these suggestions, viewed in 
isolation, is well-suited to our role in this appeal. As the 
Supreme Court held in Kotteakos: 
 
       [I]t is not the appellate court's function to determine 
       guilt or innocence. Nor is it to speculate upon probable 
       reconviction and decide according to how the 
       speculation comes out. . . . Those judgments are 
       exclusively for the jury . . . . But this does not mean 
       that the appellate court can escape altogether taking 
       account of the outcome. . . . In criminal causes that 
       outcome is . . . . guilt in law, established by the 
       judgment of laymen. And the question is, not were they 
       right in their judgment . . . . It is rather what effect the 
       error had or reasonably may have had upon the jury's 
       decision. The crucial thing is the impact of the thing 
       done wrong on the minds of other men, not on one's 
       own, in the total setting. 
 
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 763-64. Our inquiry is not whether 
this court's members would convict Mr. Mathis on the 
evidence presented, or whether we would do so based on 
that evidence plus Dr. Loftus's wrongly excluded testimony. 
Rather, we begin with the guilty verdict the jury has already 
rendered, and we determine only whether, "after an 
examination of the record," 28 U.S.C.A. S 2111, "it is highly 
probable" that the jury would have reached the same 
decision absent the identified error. Helbling , 209 F.3d at 
241. 
 
Although we believe that portions of Dr. Loftus's proffered 
testimony should have been admitted, we also find that, in 
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the context of the record as a whole, his testimony was 
highly unlikely to have caused a different result. The matter 
is not resolved simply by noting--as the government 
does--that Mr. Gantt's testimony could, if believed, have 
had great probative force and might have constituted more 
"compelling evidence" than Sergeant Gubbei's testimony. It 
is certainly possible that Mr. Mathis's jury would have 
convicted on the basis of Mr. Gantt's testimony alone, but 
we would hesitate before terming such a result "highly 
probable." Nor is it enough to find--as Mr. Mathis 
urges--that skeptical jurors might, with reasonable 
justification, have disbelieved both Mr. Gantt and Sergeant 
Gubbei. Reasonable doubt is the proper test for harmless 
error analysis concerning constitutional rights, e.g., Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999), but a less stringent 
standard regulates non-constitutional errors such as this 
one, e.g., Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65; Jannotti, 729 F.2d 
at 220 n.2. 
 
The crux of our analysis derives, not from any piece of 
testimony in isolation, but from the interlocking 
correspondence of evidence throughout the record. For 
example, it is not disputed that the testimony of several 
eyewitnesses, located inside and outside the bank building, 
confirmed Mr. Gantt's basic description of how the Sun 
National Bank robbery occurred. Photographs produced 
from the bank's video security cameras were similarly 
corroborative of this testimony. Also, Mr. Gantt's account of 
the robbers' foiled attempt to escape in the Jeep was 
virtually identical to Sergeant Gubbei's description of the 
same events from the perspective of his police cruiser. Mr. 
Gantt's identification of Mr. Seaberry as one of the co- 
conspirators was confirmed by an arresting officer's 
testimony that Mr. Seaberry was apprehended near the 
stalled Jeep, and the arrest of Mr. Seaberry also tended to 
corroborate Mr. Gantt's account of how he and Mr. Mathis 
(but not Mr. Seaberry) finally escaped. 
 
Giving Dr. Loftus's testimony its full weight, a jury might 
have had reasonable cause to doubt Sergeant Gubbei's 
description of events, if such description were viewed in 
isolation. But here, where the disputed eyewitness account 
was repeatedly confirmed by a co-conspirator's testimony, 
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and where various aspects of that co-conspirator's 
testimony were in turn confirmed by other available 
evidence, we think it highly improbable that a jury that 
voted to convict without the aid of Dr. Loftus's testimony, 
would, had it heard that testimony, have reached a 
different verdict. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the District Court's judgment 
of conviction is affirmed. 
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